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Exemplification and the use-values of cases and case studies
Mary S. Morgan
Department of Economic History, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK
H I G H L I G H T S
• Separates out cases from case studies across a range of social science fields.
• Considers modes of comparison as ways to deepen knowledge.
• Discusses different possibilities for extending knowledge beyond the original case.
• Suggests that individual case work may catalyse or crystallize knowledge for further usage.
• Argues the best way to frame case-based knowledge transfer is as a mode of exemplification.
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A B S T R A C T
This paper provides an account of the ‘use-value’ of case-based research by showing how social scientists exploit
cases, and case studies, in a variety of practices of inference and extension. The critical basis for making such
extensions relies on the power of a case, or the account given of a case (the case-study account), to exemplify
certain features of the social world in ways which prove valuable for further analysis: either of the same case, or
in many domains beyond the original case study. Framing use-values in terms of exemplification compares
favourably with understanding reasoning beyond the case either as a form of analogical reasoning or in taking
cases as experimentable objects.
1. Introduction
A broad reflective literature on case-based research flourishes
within the social science communities, focussing primarily on the
methodological issues of the genre. This literature has sometimes as-
sumed that similar problems hold across all the social sciences, though
it is clear that there is a certain particularity in both the methods and
functions of cases according to the specific discipline studied. In con-
trast, within the history and philosophy of science commentaries, the
broader questions of how ‘thinking in cases‘ works, what it is good for,
and how it differs from other epistemic genres (such as experimenting,
modelling, statistical thinking, etc), have been relatively neglected,
despite Forrester’s (1996) addition of the approach to Hacking's list of
such genres (1992).
This paper addresses this broader set of questions to enquire into the
role of cases as sites for knowledge-making. The major puzzle usually
noted about case-based knowledge, both for philosophers of science and
practising social scientists worried about their methodology, is to focus
on the inferential problems of working with cases, posing the problem
as: What can you learn from a case, given it is just one case?
Philosophers of science might see this as the question of justifying ex-
ternal or general validity, asking: How do you extend or generalise
findings from one case, either to other cases or for use with other forms
of scientific knowledge? The problem in this form can be approached by
charting the various means and modes in which particular knowledge
from any form of scientific investigation - not just case studies - can be
‘re-situated’ to other sites (see Cartwright, 2012; Morgan, 2014). An-
other approach, specific to cases, focusses on the narrative form of
explanation offered with case studies, and the extent and conditions
under which such narrative explanations constituted for one case offer
extensions to other cases (see Morgan, 2017).
The inference issue is re-framed here by asking: How do commu-
nities of researchers use the new knowledge established in an individual
case or case study? So, the problem treated here is neither how a par-
ticular case is constructed and justified in the first place, nor to analyse
some very specific methodological problems (such as how does a case
study uncover a causal mechanism), nor its (conventionally under-
stood) generalising or inferential possibilities. Rather the starting point
here argues that while an individual researcher may gain considerable
knowledge and insight from studying a case, the wider viability of cases
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as epistemic objects can be found by looking at how the community
uses them. So this study focuses on the afterlife of cases and case stu-
dies, that is - where the case, or its materials and account, are taken up
for discussion, reused and extended in various ways by a community of
researchers. This activity indicates the ‘use-value’ of cases and the aim
is to locate that value by looking at how case knowledge generates a
range of more generic knowledge formation.
Researchers take certain cases, and case studies, for re-use when
they see them as offering an exemplifying quality. It is this quality that
offers the key to the use-value of case work. In order to consider this
broad functional use of case work, the analysis differentiates cases from
case studies. Exemplary cases, such as Athenian Democracy, are known,
used and reused because the case itself stand out as unique in some
way, regardless of the quality of the accounts about them. Other cases -
possibly mundane cases - become known to a scientific community
because the researchers are seen to offer an exemplary account of the case
phenomenon in an exemplary narrative: the case study, which illumi-
nates and changes the way that the community thinks about that phe-
nomenon. That is, the particular case in the case study need not in itself
be important or exemplary, it is the account given of the phenomenon
in the case study that is considered exemplary and is used by the social
science community wherever the value of that account is taken to be
relevant. In effect, this paper distinguishes between the knowledge to
be gained from ‘the study’ separately from the ‘the case’. This may seem
a little strained, after all - how do we know about the case except
through study of it? But whereas the particulars of the case always
continue to matter for use of exemplary cases, the same may or may not
be true of exemplary case study accounts (even where exemplary case
details are sometimes ignored when a case becomes well known, they
are always there in the background). And even if the case carries the
study or vice versa to start with, the two categories do come apart.1
These two broad categories of case work can be associated with
broad use-values as follows. Exemplary cases - where the cases them-
selves are judged extraordinary - lead to knowledge accumulation via
theory-breaking, the snowballing of evidence, and the prompting of
new research questions all for the same case. Exemplary case studies -
where the cases themselves may be ordinary, but the social scientists'
treatment of them are taken as exemplary by the community - act as
knowledge ‘catalysts’ or ‘crystallizers’: they are taken to ask new
questions, or to offer new answers, new conceptual materials or new
methods, or even new policy recipes, any of which can be taken to be
potentially relevant for other cases elsewhere. These broad functional
categories of use-values cover a lot of possibilities, as we shall see in the
examples below. It is important not to mistake the claim here: all
chunks of scientific work, in any other mode, may have these use-values
and prompt further knowledge accumulation (see Morgan, 2014). The
point for cases is two-fold. One is to overturn the idea that case
knowledge is of no further use because ‘it is only one case’. The second
is to look at how such knowledge accumulation takes place in the way
that research communities use and value cases.
It is important to stress too that, as an epistemic genre in the social
sciences, case work is not a method, but offers a generic way of studying
social realms: a case or case study offers a whole, real life event or
situation, studied within its context; as such it is almost oppositional to
the genres of statistical thinking and hypothetical modelling.2 The
paper also takes the position that across the range of case work from the
human science end of psychiatry, via anthropology and sociology, to
political science and economics, and thence to social science histories,
there is a commonality in case thinking that is independent of differ-
ences in methodological approach, methods and particular questions. In
support of that point, the examples used to realise the arguments here
come from sociology, anthropology, politics, economics and economic
history. The paper begins with cases and their use-values before moving
onto the use-values of case studies, using examples to illustrate and
explore the modes of knowledge gathering that each gives rise to.
2. The use-values of cases
2.1. The case: Athenian democracy
The discussion of cases starts from Josiah Ober’s (2007) examina-
tion of the use-value (also his terminology, p 225) of the case of
Athenian democracy by political scientists and historians in the context
of a broader colloquium discussion of the comparisons and common-
alities between the role of cases, exemplary narratives (in the huma-
nities and social sciences), and model organisms in biology (see
Creager, Wise, & Lunbeck, 2007). To situate the discussion here, it is
notable that Ober is mainly concerned with what enables Athenian
democracy to function as an exemplary case, somewhat in the way that
the lab mouse, the arabidopsis plant, zebrafish, fruitflies, etc function as
exemplary research objects for biologists.3 He does not separate out the
two notions of cases and case studies, but it is clear he is mainly con-
cerned with cases.4
Whilst Ober's discussion is framed within this more general com-
parison of case work with the model organism research of biology,
there are salient differences which will emerge in the course of this
paper. To be specific, he suggests that there are commonalities in usage
qualities between model organisms and the case of historical Athens,
which enable the latter to be used over and again by social science and
humanities research communities. Ober argues that political theorists
and philosophers use the case of Athenian democracy as a testing bed
for thinking about democracy in political theory and political sociology,
and about issues of justice and rights by moral and political philoso-
phers. These users employ both thought-experimental methods on the
case, and use the case as a comparator case in order to shed light on
other possible, and current or past, political/institutional arrangements.
That is, they use the case as exemplary for current issues in both po-
sitive and normative modes even though the events and situation oc-
curred long since. While the case is an historical one, it speaks to cur-
rent problems and interests: Athenian democracy offered a ‘distinctive
form’ of democracy, which embodies characteristics which are specific
but could be more generally typical and so the case offers the possibility
of thinking about democracy as a generic type. This combination of
specific and typical is the reason it is understood as an exemplary
event/case in those fields that engage with it and have prompted a long
tradition of its usage as an exemplary case.
In his account of why and how the case supports these uses, Ober
points out (2007, p 229) that the case has a finite history, and a man-
ageable and clear body of evidence easily available, which makes it
easy to test new theories and decisively reject them against the
1 This account does not attempt to deal with the use-value of runs or sets of
cases for example, for defining the new disease category HIV/AIDs as in Ankeny
(2011); nor does it deal with the use of a run of cases in sorting out causal
claims as in Ankeny (2014). These are all further use-values of working with
cases that surely appear in the social sciences as much as in bio-medical sci-
ences.
2 As the papers in this special issue demonstrate, case work is not a method,
but rather case work may involve many different methods (thought experi-
ments, statistical measurement, modelling etc). See Morgan (2012) for a fuller,
but still broad, definition of case studies that seems to work across the social
(footnote continued)
sciences.
3 A particular model organism, as a particular case or case study, may create
something akin to Merton's “strategic research sites” (1987 p 1), but the sense
and contexts in which a case may prove to be strategic is rarely a matter of pre-
knowledge and therefore of choice. Merton of course recognises that there is an
element of luck involved. I thank one of the referees for pointing to this con-
nection.
4 Ober actually uses the term ‘exemplary narrative’ for his cases (p 225), but I
keep this label for the case-study account, not for the case.
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evidence. There is enough evidence available that can be organised
differently, so allowing competing explanations for the specifics of the
case; there is agreement on some basic elements, but disagreement over
others prompting continued investigation. The materials are “suffi-
ciently rich and fully articulated to genuinely flesh out our intuitions”
(p 230), but not so overwhelming that another researcher has to do lots
of research just to understand the case. But, above all (like model or-
ganisms) the case is a real-life case, not an hypothetical one, which
enables political scientists and philosophers to “test [their] intuitions”
in a sensible way. Ober dismisses the “bland and bizarre” (p 229) kind
of hypothetical experiments (beloved in some circles of philosophy) in
favour of serious usage of the actual historical case which forces at-
tention onto its evidential richness but also allows examination of the
salient details to provide greater depth of understanding. This creates a
“recursive relationship” (p 232-3) between theory and the interpreta-
tion of the historical evidence. While the evidence is finite, the narra-
tive gets richer as more intuitions are tried out, and as the interpreta-
tion moves on, so that what is seen as typical of Athenian democracy
changes. That is, scholars can treat the case as an object both for the-
orizing and for re-thinking the evidence.
In effect, Ober explicitly uses two other modes of scientific work for
comparison in this analysis: the case as an experimental object, and the
case as a model organism. I take up these comparisons at various points
in the paper to suggest that while both elements offer positive insights,
neither works fully in practise. Nevertheless, starting with Ober's ana-
lysis does point to how users value a specific case and to how knowl-
edge is accumulated around other such cases that have become ex-
emplary. Two examples studied intensively by both economists and
historians (and also the subject of public knowledge and commentary)
are the massive depressions that occasionally hit the economy and the
industrial revolutions that occur within economies. Their exemplary
status as events often leads to initial capitalization of their labels: the
Great Depression of 1929–36 and the First Industrial Revolution of
1780–1820, and - like the case of Athenian Democracy - they never go
off the agenda. In contrast to that latter case, the continuing presence of
the former cases in the academic realm does not betoken static evidence
sets, but rather the opposite: they remain critical sites of research work
associated with an accumulation of knowledge about the events
themselves. The complex combination of events labelled under one of
these umbrella titles provides a set of growing materials for endless re-
examination and explanations by a variety of scholars with different
interests.
Looking more carefully at these examples, we see that unlike Ober's
Athenian democracy case, these economic cases remain ‘live’ cases, and
so are even more like model organisms than the Athens case because of
the army of researchers working on these unique or extremely unusual
events who, over time, heap up new evidence around the event just as
rolling a snowball around gathers more snow. But as we shall see, it is
more problematic to frame the use-value of these cases as offering rocks
on which to break or test theories (as Ober proposed for the case of
Athenian democracy); there is a theorizing component, but this is more
a recursive activity between evidence and theorizing (which he also
proposed). These research-intensive activities typically raise new
questions about the events, prompting further new research, including,
perhaps, comparative case work.
2.2. The single case: theory-breaking rock or rolling snowball?
The case of the Great Depression of 1929–36 is characterised by a
number of basic elements: about the causes, consequences and inter-
action of those elements, and the timings of events within the case.
Economists did try to use the Great Crash of 1929–32 and the Great
Depression that followed until at least 1936 (longer in the USA) as a
rock on which to test, or rather break, theories, not in general terms,
but in terms of the critical causal account of these particular events.
And, for a while, the most active debate over the causes pitted the
monetarist account against the fiscal account: that is, a normal cyclical
depression became a ‘great’ depression because of faults either in
monetary policy or in fiscal policy.5 However such examinations did
not simply or easily confirm or refute the relevance of either theory for
the particular case. While it was possible to show that some critical
causes were not irrelevant to the overall causal story, the record of the
Great Depression did not form a viable theory-breaking rock, and did
not support clear mechanistic accounts. It is a significant feature of case
work that the whole case is analysed within its context. So, on the
theory-testing front: while individual and distinct causes (such as fiscal
or monetary policy) could have been, to some extent, isolated for ex-
amination in a kind of thought experiment, and even in statistical
testing, these causes were too highly interconnected with other factors,
including the functioning of economic institutions, to be easily separ-
able for definitive theory-testing judgements. The experimental re-
quirement for isolating causal features and controlling for others is
difficult to maintain in case work, and from this point of view, case
work is more akin to field work than to laboratory work (see Morgan,
2013).
One might wonder - why were economists and economic historians
so obsessed with this case? The answer is that just because the Great
Depression case served as an uncompromising event that stood out in
the path of history, it could not be ignored by the community, but
neither could it be easily explained. For economists seeking parsimo-
nious explanations, the continuing aim was to come down on one side
or another of the debate about causes. For economic historians, trained
as economists but cognisant of the rich possibilities of gathering further
evidence about the case, and with broader historical requirements for
explanations of events, the project proved more eclectic. As historians,
they were bound to look for more complete explanations for the event,
to bring in all the relevant factors and their interactions, thus making
accounts of the event more complicated.
Like Athenian democracy, the Great Depression was a case that
could be returned to again and again, and because it's so well-known, it
could be thinly characterised in discussions. This contrasts with the
actual thinness of the Athens case evidence and the limited availability
of new evidence which supports Ober's claims about Athens having use-
value as a (thought) experimentable object for political science. Unlike
Athenian democracy, the Great Depression is a case about which more
evidence could be collected, and as evidence became thicker it also
became messier and this undercut its plausibility as an experimental
object on which to test or break theories. But at the same time, this
supported a process in which more possibilities arose to rethink the
existing accounts. With new evidence accumulating, new questions
were raised, new explanations could be tried out, privileging new
causes or giving them different emphases - but all for the same one case.
The case-event became, for the community of researchers, less a rock
for breaking parsimonious theoretical accounts and more like a large
rolling snowball as the exemplary case gathered more evidence and was
endlessly re-interrogated in the light of that new evidence.6
For many decades after this case-event, the cycles of economic ac-
tivity offered no comparative case-events of such magnitude. There
were financial crashes, and depressions, but the Great Crash and its
associated Depression stood out as a lone boulder in an ice field. Until
5 For this US case, either the event was caused by monetary mismanagement
(over-expanding money supply in 1920s and then cutting it too far and too fast
causing the crash and depression, or perhaps prompting a small reversal into a
catastrophic depression), or it was a minor crash which was exacerbated by
fiscal mismanagement (by the combination of national and local governmental
responses) which turned the crash into a depression.
6 As trained economists they were also interested in the international trans-
mission of the financial crash from the USA to Europe and ‘periphery’ countries;
in the international co-ordination or lack of it to prevent the financial crises
becoming a general depression; in the role of economic fundamentals and
policy in perpetuating or mitigating the depression; and so forth.
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2008-9 that is, when the Global Financial Crisis (now referred to by is
initials: GFC) happened (notice how economists somehow make these
events sound like meteors hitting the earth: they ‘happen’, then they
have to be examined, explained, and made sense of, and their con-
sequences mitigated in various ways by policy actions). At this point,
the case-events of 1929–36 suddenly began to play a new role, not just
in the specialist academic communities, but in the immediate world of
policy action. It turned from a one-off phenomenon to the only avail-
able case for comparison. Over the past decade, this has mostly been a
one-way comparison, using the earlier case of the Great Crash and
Depression, with its many theoretical interpretations and empirical
characterizations, to understand the current GFC events and policy
possibilities. No doubt in time, these two events will provide com-
parative sites that enable ‘reciprocal comparison’ (see below), the later
event being used to cast light on the earlier just as the earlier is already
used to cast light on the latter.
2.3. Comparing cases: digging deeper and heaping up
The mode of ‘matched pair comparisons’ is practised at many sites
in the social sciences, either formally or informally. The Millian in-
junction to find two cases with the same features except in one respect
is designed to trace the importance and role of that one respective
difference.7 The matched pair idea is often aligned with case work, but
in such contexts, it rarely works to assess a single difference. In practice,
it is very difficult to find such well-endowed, Millian-inspired, matched
pairs of cases, and social scientists looking for such comparable cases
are more likely to find cases for which their precise differences are not
fully known, and in which there is nearly always more than one dif-
ference that is likely relevant. Nevertheless, comparative case work
does have considerable use-value even when the cases do not exhibit
the ideal matched-pair status.
While the analysis of similarity and difference has a particular as-
sociation with Mill's recipe, such comparisons were given a new spin by
the economic historian Marc Bloch (Bloch 1928, 1953). For him, the
relevant starting point might rather have been the writings of Durkheim
than Mill (see Riemersma, 1953), but at any rate, his interest was to
champion the use of comparisons within social science history. For
Bloch, the method of comparison - the hard questioning equally of si-
milarity and difference - provided: first, a recipe for discovery of hidden
facts; second, a challenge to easy interpretation of those facts; and third,
an explanation of both similarities and differences, in which particu-
larities and generalities might be questioned and ‘pseudo-causes’ and
‘dead ends’ avoided. This was an even-handed and open comparative
approach in which nothing could be taken for granted, but much could
be gained. Kocka (2003), following Weber rather than Durkheim, took
up the ‘discovery’ point: historians (in effect case workers), are highly
specialised in their field, so asking them to look at a new period or place
can have a “liberating, eye-opening, effect” (p 41).8 In contrast, Sewell
(1967) argued that Bloch's approach across all three of his aims pro-
vides - for historians - a “logic” of hypothesis testing: a regime of
“testing, reformulating, and retesting … an adaptation of experimental
logic to investigations in which actual experimentation is impossible”
(p 209). In effect, Sewell portrayed comparative history more narrowly
than Bloch (and Kocka) as an experimental method for gaining secure
explanation in history, i.e. justificatory aims rather than discovery aims
in a way that parallels Ober's view of the use of the Athens case - and
indeed other single historical cases. Perhaps it does work in this way for
political science, where these comparator cases might be many, and
thinly described in a coded form. For other social scientific fields, the
comparative method has functions closer to those envisaged by Bloch
and Kocka than to Sewell: the comparative case mode is not so much a
testing regime, or an experimental regime, but one of interrogation and
perhaps discovery, relying on the flexibility of comparison, and its ca-
pacity for in-depth study of the cases, that seems antithetical to the
narrow label of hypothesis testing.9
The eye-opening effect of comparison has been critical for other
fields, for example in studies of economic development. While tradi-
tional economic accounts began with Western economic development
as the dominant and earlier case providing the developmental recipe,
and then compared both Eastern and non-developed countries' experi-
ence against that, recent social science history has become more en-
amoured of the mode of reciprocal comparison.10 Global economic
historians have followed Pomeranz’s (2000) injunction to make more
serious two-way comparisons in taking both non-European and Eur-
opean experiences as equally valid benchmarks for each other in
learning from their similarities as well as their differences as Bloch
advocated. Since, in addition, the comparative economic performance
of one area may constrain, or enable, the experience of the other case,
and so be part of the causal set of possibilities under consideration for
both sides, these reflective comparisons are expected to be more illu-
minating, and prompt more research and questions, than the simple
benchmark comparison of an old with a new case event.11
In industrial revolutions, we have several exemplary events and the
ways in which these successive cases have been discussed shows how
valuable this reciprocal comparison of exemplary events can be. Getting
a sense of the cases in this instance is a necessary starting point for
appreciating this process. We don't have one Athens, or even two great
crashes and depressions, but a group of three ‘industrial revolutions’
and perhaps we are in the midst of the fourth. The historiography
outlines how these events have been re-interpreted over the years.
The First Industrial Revolution is dated at 1780–1820 or there-
abouts, situated in Britain, and characterised by the ‘factory system’ of
production, with textiles taken as the exemplary industry, and invol-
ving a larger scale usage of new machinery powered by the new steam
power which together reorganised the nature of work. Because this list
of characteristics betokens a qualitative change in modes of production,
rather than a step change in scale, this has been taken by economists
and historians as a revolution in how things are made. Originally the
causal prompt for the step change was taken to be individual inventors
and engineers who developed the machineries of production and of
power. Of course, this is a thin, idealized, description and analysis of
the case (which would horrify historians, but would be recognised by
economists).
As a case, it has been heavily researched and analysed, but has
proved too amorphous and too unbounded to be treated as experi-
mentable (as Sewell proposed). Even more than the Great Crash and
Depression, industrial revolutions have tremendous scope: they change
7 For a recent example arguing in this Millian vein for comparability as a
resource of inference in social science case work in political economy, see
Ruzzene, 2012.
8 Model organism researchers are - in a similar way - typically loyal to one
organism, and asking them to look at a different organism may be similarly
surprising (as was revealed in the colloquia for the Creager et al., 2007 vol).
9 There is a very considerable literature in the philosophy of history and by
practising historians on the topic of comparative history (e.g. see Cohen and
O'Connor, 2004). In short form: comparative history was originally conceived
as a recipe for getting away from nation-based history and so primarily involved
geographical comparison; but the focus more recently moved to ‘crossed’ or
‘entangled’ histories of different people and nations.
10 See Austin, 2007 for an account of the development of this social science
stance.
11 I thank Gareth Austin for the additional point that earlier industrial re-
volutions constrain later ones (they need to compete on different grounds)
compared to the ‘parallel’ developmental paths assumed in global history. This
joint constraint is similar to the wonderful conceit of David Lodge's hero of
Small World, Persse McCarrigle, who startles the world of literature by talking of
the influence of Yeats on Shakespeare: how our interpretation of Shakespeare
changes if we begin by reading Yeats (Lodge, 1984).
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more than the economy. Here the comparison with Ober's Athens is
instructive. Whereas economists can run counterfactual experiments on
some economic events, for example, about what would have happened
to an economy without the development of the railways (e.g. Fogel,
1964), they could not carry out that kind of test of effects or causes of
the Great Crash and Depression and nor can they do so with an event
designated as an Industrial Revolution. Why not? Because these kinds of
events are just too complex and widespread in content to be thought-
experimental systems, or to run statistical equivalents in theory testing.
Here is where we see the importance of the reciprocal comparisons in
gaining use-value from cases, for that first Industrial Revolution was
effectively re-characterised when the Second and then the Third In-
dustrial Revolution were taken into account.
The Second Industrial Revolution is associated with two countries,
the US and Germany in the late 19th century. In the US, the revolution
has been characterised as a new system of manufacturing which de-
veloped machines (machine tools) to make other machines, namely
consumer and producer goods (such as sewing machines and engines).
The causal accounts focussed initially again on engineering skills, this
time fixing on ingenuity in making mechanical systems. The German
revolution involved chemical industries (dyes, pharma, industrial che-
micals, etc) in which German engineers industrialised the products of
nature directly. Comparing the 1st and 2nd revolutions together re-en-
forced an Anglo-Saxon account in which Weber's protestant work ethic
featured as a centrepiece in the causal account for both, but in which
the reciprocal comparison (looking backward to the First Revolution
and from there forward to the Second) also suggested that the failure of
Britain to experience the 2nd revolution might be attributed to their
class system (compared with the USA) and their poor science (com-
pared with Germany). The Third Industrial Revolution is associated
with Japan post WWII - making manufactured goods cheaper and
(eventually) with better quality. Its main causal account fixed on re-
lative factor costs: Japan had shortages of capital and labour and raw
materials and so had to save on all these inputs in a ‘lean production
method’, and succeeded by introducing stringent quality controls. In
turn, this third case reflected light back onto the productive input
factors of the first and second industrial revolutions. This comparison
was sufficient to rewrite both their accounts, for the new focus sug-
gested that Britain in the first event had cheap labour and capital so
used more of both productively, while in the second, the USA had ex-
pensive labour and capital but very cheap raw materials, so evolved a
generation of technology that saved the two former and was profligate
with the latter factor. Strong economic factor arguments were privi-
leged over earlier cultural explanations based on religion, work ethics,
Yankee ingenuity, German education, and smart inventors. Once again,
this is a very thin account of the main arguments, but in a sense these
details are not important, right or wrong, either as bits of history or as
economic arguments. It is the mode of comparison that harnesses the
use-value of the cases here.
Just articulated is an account of three exemplary cases, prompting
reciprocal comparisons in which it is the similarities as well as the
differences which provoked redescriptions, new evidence, reassess-
ments of old causes and new causes, new materials, and new theoretical
accounts. Notice too that these Industrial Revolution labels include
numbering: they are conceived of as separate cases, of the same general
genre but with very different characteristics. One industrial revolution
is useful; three are more than three times as valuable because the re-
ciprocal comparison prompts new factors to be taken into account in the
study of all three events. Here the recursive relationships are not just
between case and theory (as Ober marks), but between different
Industrial Revolutions with different characteristics provoking the de-
velopment of theories to cover each and all cases. The knowledge ac-
cumulation here is not via rocks (the cases as detailed by their causal
accounts are too unstable), nor rolling snowballs (not just adding more
evidential layers) but via digging deeper and heaping up evidence on
previously overlooked characteristics while theorizing new plausible
causes, and so this sequence cumulates knowledge about all three cases,
not just one. This is a discovery mode of science.
I have labelled these cases as ‘exemplary’ and suggested, following
Ober, that exemplary cases might have similarities - in the tool box of
science - to model organisms, because both offer scientific objects that
repay multiple and repeated investigation. There are some important
differences, and so here is where Ober's analogy with model organisms
in biology not so much breaks down as enables us to see two general
salient points about the way social scientists use cases.
First, the Industrial Revolutions example shows the importance of
the scope of comparison, both similarity and difference, as ways for
social scientists to learn about their cases. Model organisms are not
usually used in a reciprocal comparative mode in quite this way.
Comparisons of the lab mouse and humans do surely rely on qualities
judged to be similar or different, but those comparisons are likely to be
specific to particular questions, rather than open-ended enquiries into
the nature of both organisms. And while the mouse may serve as a
model organism for human health issues, it is less likely that the human
will serve as a reciprocal model organism for mouse health issues: this is
usually a one-way and limited comparison.
Second, the point about these exemplary cases is that they exemplify
something taken to be important to the research community. And be-
cause they exemplify, they have potential to speak to new questions and
new problems for recognisably similar objects in the same broad do-
main. The different cases of the industrial revolution can be conceived
of as the same kind of thing, the same class of thing, so that the simi-
larity and difference is within the class. In contrast, the arguments for
using model organisms depend, not on exemplification, but on analo-
gical reasoning which relies on establishing limited domains of simi-
larity between two different kinds of things, say lab mice and humans,
which then justifies the knowledge (eg about disease) to transfer from
one organism (lab mice) to another (humans) (see Ankeny, 2007, and
further back, Hesse, 1966). Both rely on similarity judgements but
made on two different bases: exemplification and analogy. The im-
portant point here is that the qualities of social science cases as a kind of
scientific object do not fully determine their methods of analysis any
more than the qualities of model organisms determine their methods of
analysis. But whether they exemplify, or are dependent on analogical
reasoning, in relation to other similar/different objects does determine
how they can have use-value for scientists.
3. The use-values of case studies
In cases such as Athenian democracy and the First Industrial
Revolution, the actual events or cases themselves have been taken by
social scientists to exemplify a social science phenomenon (a type of
democracy, a type of economic upheaval) and its package of char-
acteristics. And there are surely other phenomena in the social science
range that have been defined by such exemplifying events. These cases
remain important as they define the generic type, and their particular
details also remain important as signals of generic characteristics. But,
as argued above, thinking with cases means reusing the same case again
and again, thus the useful, but also limited, analogy with model or-
ganisms.
In contrast, in case studies, the case itself does not necessarily re-
main important to any further use - so the analogy with model organ-
isms is immediately lost. Of course, there are many case studies un-
dertaken of many different social phenomena and events, and most
have rather limited further use. Yet there are some, where, even though
the case itself is taken to be rather ordinary (just one amongst many
examples of a phenomenon), the account (or aspects of the account)
given by the social scientist of the case is taken to be exemplary by
others in the community. The important point here is that knowledge
accumulates not around the original case, as in the above examples of
Athenian democracy or the Great Depression, but around the poten-
tially more generic phenomena that was discovered or explained in the
M.S. Morgan Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 78 (2019) 5–13
9
original case study, that is, around the account given of the case. Such
accounts offer, in Elgin’s (2011) apt phrase: “a telling instance …. that
exemplifies” (p 409).12
While we can easily mark the importance of any individual case
study within a scholarly community by following citations, it is also
possible to trace the kinds of materials taken from such an individual
case study, and show how these materials served as exemplary mate-
rials, valued in their communities of use. There can be many aspects in
a case study account that can be taken as exemplary, and thus many
different aspects of case knowledge that provide use-value for other
researchers, and these can be used in different ways. Analysis of the
ways in which these exemplary cases study accounts are used by their
communities of researchers suggests a broad distinction between two
different ways in which this process of extension works: namely, where
the exemplary case account acts as catalyst, and at other times, as
crystallizer.
The first kind of use-value occurs when individual pieces of research
act as a catalyst for further research on a phenomenon, a process which
may be found with other research genres. But it is important to include
this general category here because of the anxiety within philosophy and
social science communities that case studies can only teach you some-
thing about the original case at hand. The information gathered to-
gether within a case study provides evidence on a phenomenon that can
prompt further research on that phenomenon in other cases. But it is
not just empirical findings that prompt further research in the com-
munity. In fact, as we shall see, there are many aspects of case studies
that can be, and are, taken to exemplify and so be potentially generic
for other similar cases. And because case studies may offer a great
variety in kinds of evidence and methods, they may offer greater pos-
sibilities for catalysing research in related contexts than some other
genres of scientific work where the methods and evidence sets are more
constrained.
The second kind of use-value comes when case studies act as a
crystallizer. Again, the point is not that this is a function only true of the
exemplary narratives of case studies, but that it is an unexpected, lar-
gely unexplored and important function of case studies. And when a
case study acts in this way it has the potential to inform, and be used
for, a much wider set of other cases of a phenomenon or for a much
wider domain of argument.
3.1. Case studies as catalysts
A case study account can be considered exemplary when the com-
munity uses it to gather knowledge around the generic account of the
phenomenon suggested in the case account, deepening and extending
understanding for other potentially similar cases, but the community
rarely engages in further research on that particular same case. There
are a number of ways in which this occurs, because almost any aspect of
a case study might be taken to exemplify something of use-value to the
community and which then has the effect of catalysing further work in
the domain or on the topic. For example, Robert Fogel’s (1964) coun-
terfactual case study of the effects of the railroads on American eco-
nomic growth in the nineteenth century provided a calculating recipe
that other scholars followed in assessing the contribution of other na-
tional systems of rail transport to the growth and development of those
nations. In another example, Crasnow (2012, 2017) analyses how
Kenneth Schultz (2001) used causal ‘process tracing’ to analyse the
Fashoda Incident, an exemplar case of the ‘democratic peace hypoth-
esis’ that democracies don't go to war with each other. While the case
gained the status of an exemplary case for this thesis, it is the causal
account or narrative explanation that Schultz gave which became the
subject of further usage, analysis and discussion in the political science
community. In a third example in sociology, William Foote Whyte’s
(1943) study of a slum community group contained studies of the re-
lationship between an individual's performance in a group activity and
their status within the group. He produced some anecdotal accounts of
this relation, and prompted some contrived experiments within the
community he studied. These observations and proposed explanations
were taken up by sociologists and psychologists working on small group
behaviour to create research designs for formal experimental situations
studying that relationship.
An exemplary case study may well prompt several different kinds of
uses. A good example is found in the use-value made of a case study
analysis of firm exit from declining industries discussed by Charles
Baden-Fuller (1989). That particular case account provided a ‘narrative
explanation’ of the phenomenon that was extended to many further
cases in other times and places: it proved flexible to extension (see
Morgan, 2017). I revisit the case here to reflect on how it offered
multiple use-values for the community.
Baden-Fuller studied the order of exit of firms within a declining
industry in the context of policy issues about such declining industries.
In this case (the steel castings industry in the UK in the 1980s), the
order of exit was not as expected: the least profitable firms did not quit
the industry first, and the order tended to be that the more profitable
firm exited first. The explanatory account in this case became ex-
emplary for the community because there was a strong commitment in
economic theory, almost a base assumption or ideology, that such order
of exit would always be ‘efficient’ (i.e. in order of profitability), and so,
finding a case where this was not so, was a matter of considerable in-
terest. So, first of all, the account was noticed because of the surprise
factor - this was a case study whose findings went against the funda-
mental assumptions of the field. Second, it was one of the few pieces of
empirical work on the topic. Exit happens regularly, but there are few
empirical analyses of it, for it is a hard space to work in as the evidence
easily disappears as firms exit and industries decline. Third, the ex-
planation based on causal factors made sense within the economics
community, it was acceptable within the context of industrial eco-
nomics: the individual factors were not strange, it was their particular
combination which proved salient. Fourth, the methods were normal
within the community: statistical work, modelling, game theoretic
considerations, and even interview (ethnographic) evidence. The find-
ings were discussed first in a 1984 workshop and subsequently in a
1986 book and a paper (in a mainstream journal) which flagged this as
a ‘case’ account: ‘Exit from Declining Industries and the Case of Steel
Castings’ (Baden-Fuller, 1989). Tracing the paper citations into the
places of use, it is clear that both analytical work and findings were
explicitly used (not just cited) more than 50 times over the following 20
years in a variety of places. They were used in high-tech academic
journals in economics, in practitioner management journals, in text-
books in game theory and in reports for policy units and policy dis-
cussion in the EU, UK, and Japan. It is important, however, to illumi-
nate more carefully the process by which that explanatory account was
used in those pieces of further research on the topic and so to examine
how its use-value arose in those other contexts.
At no point did the community simply make a bold inference that
because these findings were relevant to that particular case, they could
therefore be used to explain the order of firm exit everywhere, or
anywhere, else. But at the same time, the community did not take much
interest in the specific time, place or industrial sector involved - these
elements of the case were just not seen to be relevant. Rather, studying
this paper trail shows exactly how the main elements of the case study
were used. Whereas the case events might have been seen as abnormal
in economic experience, and their explanation ingenious, the methods
used to treat the problem were not. The surprise factor of the account
opened up a set of questions for these other researchers to ask. On the
12 Elgin refers here to the value of experiments in a comparison of ex-
emplification in the arts and sciences in the context of a discussion of Nelson
Goodman's views on art. It is not so clear that her further analysis of ex-
emplification in the context of experiments is applicable here to case-based
science.
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one hand, these were empirical questions: does this strange pattern
happen regularly, and does it occur with the same number of small
causal factors in other situations? On the other hand, there were the-
oretical questions: how did this pattern work, how should the theory of
exit be developed and how could one model this? And there were also
policy issues - if this set of causal factors were involved, what would be
a relevant policy for intervening in declining industries? In other words,
the case account, or exemplary narrative, proved a catalyst prompting a
host of new research questions and activities all investigating the exit
phenomenon in different ways. Following the paper trail of citations,
we can see that the case study account was used:
∗ in support of general and more specific theoretical findings on the
problem of efficiency of markets
∗ as indicative for such theory development in a specific problem-
solving mode
∗ as a source of testable hypotheses for other possibly similar cases
∗ as a source of variables for such statistical analyses
∗ as evidence relevant for comparable situations in other times and
places
∗ as a rare set of empirical findings where few others existed
∗ as evidence for policy interventions
That is, taken in all, the case account figured in a series of attempts
to figure out the characteristics of the exit phenomenon and to give
both descriptive and causal accounts of the process in empirical, the-
oretical, and policy domains.
Studying this case study account illustrates the range of use-values
from the original account that were taken up in the community. Though
few case studies may catalyse so many and such different forms of
work, these observed uses would be very poorly described as those
scientists making inferences from the case study unless we have a very
broad sense of inference. This is why I suggest we think of the case
study here acting as a catalyst for other researchers in extending their
knowledge of the phenomenon of firm exit both narrowly and broadly
conceived. Again, it is worth pointing out that any genre of scientific
work could have this catalysing effect, so the claim is not specific to the
use of case studies, but rather the point to note is that one case study
can prompt so many further uses.
3.2. Case studies as crystallizers
It is surely evident that different kinds of scientific work can, from one
particular piece of work, act to crystallize some important piece of
knowledge in the field. Indeed, the literature on ‘crucial experiments’
suggests just such a function for experiments. Case studies that might be
deemed ‘crucial’ are not likely to be determinative in the same way as
experiments, but rather to crystallize some relatively abstract level of
contribution which is taken by the community of researchers to offer an
idea, concept, or notion that can be used in many other cases or contexts.
This crystallizing insight can be at different levels, and be useful in dif-
ferent domains, and may well be associated (but not necessarily) with
overturning some other taken-for-granted concepts or assumptions.
One of the most impressive examples of this crystallizing role is
found by following the reception of William Foote Whyte's Street Corner
Society (hereafter SCS) which was first published in 1943, with a brief
preface explaining how he came to do the work. It was re-issued in
1955 with an extensive appendix (79 pages) on his experience of re-
search; the study was issued again in 1981, with the final edition in
1993 to mark the 50 years from its first appearance. By the time of its
50th anniversary, over 200,000 copies of the book had been sold (which
implies a considerable non-academic readership), and it has been
translated into eight languages (including Japanese and Chinese). Both
the study, and his appendix on his methods, received separate critical
and laudatory attention.
The point that most of the reviews of the 1st edition of SCS in 1943
picked out, and several times quoted directly, was that slums were not
disorganised places, but societies. As Whyte wrote in his original 1943
book preface: “It is customary for the sociologist to study the slum district
in terms of ‘social disorganization’ and to neglect to see that an area such
as Cornerville has a complex and well-established organization of its own”
(SCS, p viii, original 1943 edition). Whyte saw this as perhaps the major
contribution of his book for he flagged it carefully in his concluding
chapter. Sociologists of that period apparently regarded slum commu-
nities in terms of their social problems, rather than as organised social
systems. This is perhaps a hang-over of the middle-class activist and
settlement-house root of American sociology - the settlement's role was to
bring people into their own ‘better’ society rather than to live with
communities as members of their society. But it was also a feature of
academic and theoretical sociology of the time to claim that slum com-
munities were not ‘societies’. It is perhaps difficult to imagine at this
distance that one of the main imports of Whyte's observation of this
community of street corner-boys in SCS was not the revelations about the
life of those individuals who hung out on the street corners, nor about the
relationship between these groups, the police and the illegal activities of
the area and the local political figures, but that these individuals formed
social groups that intersected with other social groups in ways which it
was reasonable to label a ‘society’ - a social organization rather than the
‘disorganization’ that other researchers typically assumed.
This was a case study whose main concept was taken up in many
places - it provided an exemplary narrative account of the nature of a
certain kind of community to the extent that his label became the name
for a kind of society. SCS's label refers not to the urban, teen gangs who
are thought to thrive on aimless violence; it is not about the juvenile
delinquents known to the settlement houses and the public authorities
of the late 19th century as to their equivalents of today. The label refers
to a slightly different and older group who make society in street life,
those whose life takes place on the street because there is no-where else
for them to be because of lack of money, jobs, or domestic space.13
Creating the terminology ‘street corner society’ for this form of com-
munity is rightly considered one of the major contributions to sociology
of Whyte's study and proved to be a label highly flexible to extension. It
is not quite a concept, not a theory, not an hypothesis, but it is some-
thing more than a simple description for it carries with it a set of
characteristics of that society: a ‘conceptual label’ seems appropriate. It
names a phenomenon, and so crystallizes recognition of a particular way
of life which may be known casually, but not fully appreciated, and not
known previously as a sociological kind. The term's aptness is re-
cognised by it being - once pointed out - seen as known all along: the
term has a fitness that leads to multiple and easy usage. For example,
and in contrast, Ware’s (1935) discussion of the “hang-around” groups
in Greenwich, while organising the same characteristics of behaviour,
lacks the implicit paradox of naming them as a society (and it was by no
means the centrepiece of her findings as it was for Whyte).
‘Street corner society’ gained an immediate life as a conceptual term
of art, and of reference. Extensive searches reveal no uses of the term in
the social sciences and humanities journal literature before the book
was published, and considerable usage afterwards (see Table 1). SCS is
usually referenced with its author attached, and in those cases where it
is not they are mainly addressed to audiences who would be presumed
to know the reference. It remains pretty stable in use over the decades,
including the extent to which it has been used outside the main field of
sociology.
13 Once Whyte licenses the term ‘street corner society’, it did get used to refer
to other kinds of groups, particularly younger gangs, practising less law-like
behaviour, so that its meaning spreads out. SCS also escapes from both aca-
demic life and policy circles: it turns up as the name for a New York a cappella
group in the 1960s, the name for a website devoted to ‘edgy’ Quakerism, and a
description for those peopling Fassbinder's film Katzelmacher (see Thomas,
1976).
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Much as the users of the exit case discussed above, and as suggested
for SCS in the example of small group behaviour mentioned earlier,
readers of SCS were sufficiently convinced by Whyte's explanations of
some detailed events and phenomena in his case study to use those
directly in their own work. And, as with the earlier exit case, these
explanations and details were treated as freely detachable from the
original case materials. What is different here is the acceptance and
usage of the generic phenomenon of ‘society’ at the street corner, which
had very considerable and wide scope, found and used not just in so-
ciology and its sub-fields but in anthropology, law, criminology, edu-
cation, ethnic studies, ethno-musicology, and so forth. While the degree
of appropriation might imply a general inference move, the details of
usage, both within and beyond the fields of sociology and social an-
thropology attest rather to the power of the conceptual label and de-
scription to organise or recognise similar kinds of street gangs where
they are found. Thus, the label crystallizes the social science commu-
nity's knowledge of a huge number of other cases and of their char-
acteristics. Here we have the generic power of the label crystallizing
knowledge in other cases, and acting as an umbrella to cover those
cases, but does not imply that such groups will be found everywhere.
This is in contrast to the label of the Industrial Revolution, in some ways
a rather similar combination - a conceptual label with a set of char-
acteristics - but one with relatively few attested cases, in which the label
itself has a less clear and less stable set of characteristics, and yet where
the original details are still taken to matter.
The crystallizing function of case studies may not necessarily pro-
duce a new label, it may, rather, suggest a new account of phenomena
in situations where there is a degree of unsatisfactoriness in existing
accounts and some emergent ideas about the phenomena. Thus, in the
sociology domain, Kantor (1977) was instrumental in re-focussing the
way sociologists conceived of the behaviour of men and women in work
organisations. This seminal case account evidenced her claim that the
discriminatory practices that kept women from progressing in corporate
American organisations were due neither to prejudices held by men,
nor to cultural attitudes which determined the respective behaviours of
both women and men, but due to the structures within organisations
which created behaviour patterns in how members of both groups be-
haved. Where the earlier existing accounts were in different ways un-
satisfactory, this case study crystallized the notion that behaviour pat-
terns were set by organisational structures, an idea soon recognised and
taken up by other social scientists (see Morgan, 2017a). It located the
problem away from the socio-psychology realm into the sociology of
organisations to offer a different kind of explanatory framing in a way
that gradually gained considerable power. Another case study account,
which also cast a slower shadow compared to the immediate impact of
SCS, is Davis et al.’s (1941) anthropological study of a Southern US
community which showed that a society could involve both ‘castes’ and
‘classes’ - overturning social scientific beliefs of the day which assumed
that a society would present one or other but not both kinds of strati-
fication. This case study carefully delineated both the classes within
white and black communities and the caste differences between white
and black, and went further in delineating ‘cliques’ as another hier-
archical set within societies. Both these two case study accounts pro-
vided the depth of evidence and analysis to convince social scientists
that these new ideas and concepts held real salience elsewhere - that is,
the exemplifying power of the case study changed the way scholars
thought about some phenomenon by offering an account which crys-
tallized ideas that might be nascent, but not fully worked out, and
which made sense of the particular terrain in ways that offered ideas of
broader scope and worth relevant for many other sites.
Such a crystallizing function may be evident not in the academic
domain but in the public domain. For an example going back to in-
dustrial economics, Baden-Fuller and Stopford’s (1991) case study of
washing machine manufacture in the 1980s investigated why there
were still lots of national-based firms in Europe when it was widely
assumed that efficiency considerations would mean there would be one
large global manufacturer, supplying more cheaply because producing
at larger-scale. It turned out that the reason for the continuation of
smaller national firms was because different consumer groups had
preferences for different designs of washing machines: Germans wanted
high spin speed, French wanted top-loaders for small spaces, Italians
wanted slow spin speeds to dry their washing in the sun, and so forth.
This case study account was reported in the public domain, by The
Economist, where it was taken as exemplary evidence for a larger claim
that there could never be single European-wide dominant firms in these
kinds of industries, that is, for the claim that the forces of globalization
were limited by demand side factors. The case study account was then
picked up and quoted in the UK Parliament as evidence that there never
could be a single market in Europe, just at the time that the single
market legislation was being debated. So, insight from the single case
study account was first crystallized into a broad finding about the
nature of globalization, and then its importance further expanded into a
finding with political and policy implications about the nature of the
European economy. The washing machine findings crystallized argu-
ments about globalization and the European market, and here the case
story remained in the discussion to exemplify the general argument (but
not to prompt further research on washing machines!). So rather than
an extension of the argument to other similar cases at the same level
that was evident in the industry exit example, or the wide adoption of
the nature of slum societies as in SCS, exemplification worked here by
expanding the scope of the argument/explanation to a much broader
canvas.
4. Conclusion
This analysis and these examples show how cases and case studies
have independent use-values in social science communities.15 The
analysis also points to the manifest ways social science communities
work with cases and case studies to realise their potential use-values
beyond the individual case or the original case study. While the means
and modes of working with cases and case studies vary, and the
knowledge accumulation possibilities also differ, it is characteristic that
there are many ways of learning from cases and from case studies which
go beyond making inferences, either specifically or generally, from the
original findings. Indeed, the discussion here points to the many dif-
ferent exemplifying materials that case studies offer, and thus the very
Table 1
Citations to Street Corner Society by decade.
Years 1943–50 1951–60 1961–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–10
SCS 50 132 167 160 181 167 94
SCS only in Sociology 31 82 105 99 89 93 41
Cumulative Total SCS 50 182 349 509 690 857 953
Notes: JSTOR Database search shows by decade, the number of citations for the book title in row 1, and of those, the number in
sociology journals (as defined by JSTOR) in row 2. The final row is the cumulative total of row 1.14
14 I thank Judy Laffan for undertaking this search, and extensive further re-
search work on which this case study of the impact of SCS is based.
15 There may also be hybrid objects in which the case and the study are both
found usable independently.
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diverse practices of inference associated with case-based modes of re-
search. This in turn has filled in the ways in which case study findings
can have extensions across other cases, increase their scope, and -
especially in their crystallizing vein - initiate or contribute to the for-
mation of new conceptual or abstract materials.
If ‘thinking in cases’ is conceived as an epistemic genre, the argu-
ments here offer reasons for differentiating case-based thinking from
model organism research and from experimental research. While the
latter difference offers no real surprise for cases have all the qualities
that make experimentation deeply problematic, the former difference
depends on the bridge to further knowledge sites being framed as a
similarity argument based on exemplification as opposed to on analo-
gical reasoning.
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